In this paper we provide a formal account of how information about causal processes (i.e., knowledge of the causal chain linking an explanatory variable to an outcome variable) can be used to sharpen causal inferences. All of this is done within a Bayesian potential outcomes causal model. The methods discussed in this paper empower researchers by providing them with a richer palette of causal assumptions than typically employed. At the same time, because the methods are embedded in a rigorous counterfactual causal model, researchers are held to high standards of transparency and logical consistency. We illustrate these methods with an application to the effects of election day registration on African American turnout. This analysis shows that traditional regression or matching estimates for these effects are likely overstated.
Introduction
Simple versions of the so-called "Neyman-Rubin causal model" take an essentially black-box approach to causality-in an ideal randomized experiment it is not necessary to know how, i.e., through what mechanisms, a particular treatment works in order to consistently estimate a variety of causal effects. All that is necessary is random assignment of treatment along with assumptions that guarantee that potential outcomes are well-defined for all relevant units. Of course scholars as diverse as Fisher (quoted in Cochran (1965) ), Collier and Brady (2004) , George and Bennett (2005) , Brady et al. (2006) , Hedström (2008) and others have argued that one can, and should, posit causal mechanisms linking the treatment variable to the outcome variable and one should think carefully about the observable implications of this casual process. This is especially important when confronted with observational data.
Our goal in this paper is to provide a formal explanation for how data on post-treatment variables can help sharpen causal inferences relating to total effects-the overall effect of an explanatory variable on an outcome variable. The basic idea is that, in many applications, researchers may be able to make more plausible causal assumptions conditional on the value of an intermediate variable than they would be able to do unconditionally. As data become available on an intermediate variable, these conditional causal assumptions become active and the posterior distribution over causal quantities becomes more concentrated.
To get a sense of the argument, consider the following stylized example. We are interested in the effect of motor voter laws on turnout. We observe data from a single individual and we know that in 1992 she did not live in a motor voter state and that she did not vote in the 1992 presidential election. Without additional knowledge, all that we can say is that the individual causal effect of the motor voter law for this person is either 0 (she is a "never voter" and would not have voted even if motor voter registration had been available) or it is positive (she would have been "helped" to vote by motor voter registration). Now suppose we learn that this person registered to vote in the spring of 1992. Since most, if not all, of the presumed effect of motor voter provisions on voting is assumed to work by decreasing the costs of registration and thus increasing registration, it seems that most researchers would now be more likely to conclude that our hypothetical citizen is a "never voter"-in other words, enacting a motor voter provision in this person's state prior to 1992 would not have increased her likelihood of voting since she was already registered on election day. Obviously, this conclusion depends on strong assumptions (although these assumptions seem plausible for this scenario), and for many applications we may want to weaken these assumptions (or combine them with other types of assumptions). Furthermore, while this story is operating at the individual-level, it is not difficult to aggregate over a number of such individual-level stories in order to estimate the distribution of effects.
A small but growing literature attempts to formalize the use of intermediate/post-treatment variables to improve inference for total causal effects in observational data with heterogeneous causal effects. The front door technique (Pearl, 1995 (Pearl, , 2000 and its extensions (Tian and Pearl, 2002a,b) demonstrate that the average total causal effect can sometimes be nonparametrically identified with the use of post treatment variables, even when treatment assignment is non-ignorable. Signed directed acyclic graphs (VanderWeele, 2008; VanderWeele and Robins, 2009) can sometimes be used to determine the direction of bias. Furthermore, Kuroki and Cai (2008) and Kaufman et al. (in press ) find large sample bounds for total effects based on linear constraints that utilize the observation of a post-treatment variable. 1
In this paper we extend the Bayesian potential outcomes model of Quinn (2009) with the potential-outcomes path-analytic decomposition of Glynn (2009) . This allows us to perform small sample inference for total effects and the joint distribution of potential outcomes, to weaken some of the assumptions made in Kuroki and Cai (2008) and Kaufman et al. (in press) , and to incorporate case study information in the analysis. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some causal questions that might be asked regarding a dichotomous treatment and outcome. Section 3 presents a "traditional" analysis of the turnout effects of election day registration for African Americans that utilizes pre-treatment variables. Section 4 presents the potential outcomes path analytic approach with a dichotomous intermediate variable, and describes the general problem of specifying assumptions in this framework. Section 5 presents an application of this methodology to the effects of election day registration on turnout for African Americans. We demonstrate that the effect on African-American turnout of the adoption of election day registration (in states that do not currently have that option) would likely be much smaller than the effect indicated by the traditional regression or matching approaches of Section 3. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of this work for future research.
Causal Questions with Dichotomous Treatment and Outcome
Consider a generic dichotomous treatment that may affect a dichotomous outcome for each unit of analysis in a study. It is conventional to label the active treatment condition as treatment and the passive treatment condition as control. It is also conventional to label one of the two outcomes as successful and the other as failure. For example, the US Voting Rights Act (1965, 1970) dictates that individuals may be required to register to vote no more than 30 days prior to the election in which they intend to vote, and hence the 30-day registration requirement may be thought of as the control treatment condition. Additionally, a number of states have recently adopted a policy of allowing individuals to register on election day, and hence we might label the availability of election day registration as the treatment treatment condition. 2 Furthermore, we might think that the two registration policies will have different effects on whether individuals decide to turnout to vote, and we can label voting as a successful outcome for each individual and not voting as a failed outcome for each individual.
If we are willing to assume that an individual's outcome (e.g. decision to turnout to vote) does not depend on whether other individuals receive the treatment or control condition, and we further assume that each individual could potentially have received either the treatment or the control condition, then we can categorize the individuals in our study into one of four types: Always succeeders would have succeeded (e.g. voted) regardless of whether they received the treatment or control condition (e.g. 30-day or election day registration). Never succeeders would have failed (not voted) regardless of whether they received the treatment or control condition (30-day or election day registration). Helped individuals would have succeeded (voted) if they received the treatment condition (election day registration) but would have failed (not voted) if they had received the control condition (30-day registration). Hurt individuals would have failed (not voted) if they received the treatment condition (election day registration) but would have succeeded (voted) if they had received the control condition (30-day registration). These response types are summarized recent work has related the intent-to-treat effects conditional on principal strata to as-treated effects conditional on the observed compliance behavior (Have et al., 2004) . Furthermore, work on indirect effects and mediation analysis in the potential outcomes framework uses this same model (Robins and Greenland, 1992; Pearl, 2001; Robins, 2003; Glynn, 2009; Imai et al., 2009 (0) fail (0) never 0-0=0 succeed (1) fail (0) helped 1-0=1 fail (0) succeed (1) hurt 0-1=-1 in Table 1 , where we have labeled successful potential outcomes with a 1 and failed potential outcomes with a 0. Furthermore, this quantification of outcomes allows the definition of individual treatment effects (ITEs) as the difference between the outcome under treatment and the outcome under control. Unfortunately, we will never directly observe the response type of any individual because we only observe each individual under either the treatment condition or the control condition. In some cases it may be possible to collect additional information on each individual in order to guess their response type. In the registration example, we could collect additional information about nonvoters in the 30-day states (perhaps through interviews) in an attempt to determine their reasons for not voting. This case study technique depends on the quality of this additional information (and perhaps the honesty of interviewed individuals). Alternatively, for individuals that were observed in two elections (one under the treatment condition and one under the control condition) we could compare their voting behavior under the two conditions. This sort of crossover study assumes that each individual did not change their response type across the two elections.
However, even if we cannot determine the response type of each individual, we can always rule out two of the types. If an individual received the control condition and failed (e.g. 30-day registration and didn't vote), then we know that their type is never or helped. If an individual received the control condition and succeeded (e.g. 30-day registration and voted), then we know that their type is always or hurt. If an individual received the treatment condition and failed (e.g. election day registration and didn't vote), then we know that their type is never or hurt. If an individual received the treatment condition and succeeded (e.g. election day registration and voted), then we know that their type is always or helped. Table 2 summarizes these conditions as well as the associated possible values for the individual causal effect.
Although the response types of individuals are only partially determined, many research questions can be answered when we know something about the proportions of individuals in each of the response types. In the program evaluation setting, we often want to know the average effect of the program on the participants. This average effect, sometimes called the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT), can be described in two ways. First, the ATT is just the average of the ITEs from Table 1 for all treated units. Second, this average corresponds to the difference between the proportion helped among the treated minus the proportion hurt among the treated.
If instead of evaluating an existing program, we consider extending a program to the control units, then we might like to know the average effect of the program among the non-participants. This average effect is sometimes called the Average Treatment effect on the Controls (ATC), and can be described as the proportion helped minus the proportion hurt among the control units. If instead we want to compare the average effect of the policy that treats all units in the population to the policy that treats no units in the population, then we need only average ATT and ATC according to the probability of treatment. Finally, in legal settings, we may want to know the proportion of the untreated and failed individuals who would have been helped by the treatment (or the proportion of treated and failed individuals who were hurt by the treatment).
All of these questions can be asked for subpopulations. For example, given the historical use of registration requirements to disenfranchise African-American citizens, we may want to examine the effects of election day registration on this group. Furthermore, within the context of the registration example, the election day registration states are unlikely to revoke the ability of individuals to register on election day, so we will instead focus for the remainder of this paper on the treatment effects for the controls (i.e. what would have happened to African-American turnout in the 30-day states if election day registration had been available). In the next section we attempt to answer this question with data from the 2004 Current Population Survey.
Traditional Analysis of the Effects of Election Day Registration
Many studies (Rosenstone and Wolfinger, 1978; Powell Jr, 1986; Nagler, 1991; Highton, 1997 Highton, , 2004 Achen, 2008) utilize cross-sectional Current Population Survey data at the individual level to address the effects of registration laws (e.g. election day registration) on voter turnout. 3 To demonstrate our methods we analyze 2004 CPS data, coding the relevant variables as the following:
Throughout this section we restrict our attention to voting-age African-Americans. Table 3 presents the data on voting behavior on residence in an EDR state in a 2 × 2 table. Table 4 takes the same data but adds information on the registration status of each individual, resulting in a 2 × 2 × 2 table. In addition, we will, at some points adjust for a number of measured covariates including: family income, age, sex, and education. All of these variables are as defined in the 2004 CPS.
In this section we look at two commonly used methods of making casual inferences using crosssectional data-logistic regression and matching. The purpose of this section is to provide some sense of what typical researchers might infer about the effect of EDR on voting based on the CPS data under study. In Section 5 we compare these traditional results-results that do not condition on the post-treatment registration variable-to our results that do account for information on registration. Throughout Section 3 our causal estimand will be the average treatment effect on the control units (ATC). Within the context of our voting application this estimand is formally defined as:
In words, ATC is simply the increase in turnout we would have expected if EDR had been implemented in all non-EDR states (and remained in effect in current EDR states) in 2004.
Logistic Regression
It is common for researchers to apply a logistic regression or probit model to data similar to the CPS data in order to infer the causal effect of election day registration on voting. The extent to which such an enterprise will be successful depends on the extent to which conditional ignorability holds given the covariates selected by the researcher as well as how accurately the researchers' regression models approximate the true conditional expectation of voting given EDR status and the other covariates.
While researchers typically only report coefficient estimates and their standard errors (or perhaps simple differences in fitted probabilities) these quantities will not typically correspond directly to ATC. Nonetheless, it is easy to use such regression results to construct an estimate of ATC (for instance, see Chapter 5 of Pearl (2000)). Specifically, we can estimate ATC with:
where C is the set of individuals who received control (EDR = 0), |C| is the cardinality of that set, z i is the vector composed of individual i's observed covariates (family income, education, sex, age, and a constant term), and
is the conditional probability of voting given EDR and the measured covariates under the logistic regression model. Table 5 reports results from a series of nine logistic regression models. These models range from the fairly flexible model 1 in which all two-way interactions are present along with three-way interactions between (EDR, sex, family income), (EDR, sex, age), and (EDR, sex, education), to the extremely parsimonious model 9 that only includes EDR and a constant term. Looking across the row that provides the estimates of ATC, we see that these estimates are remarkably stable across the various specifications-ranging from 0.096 under the parsimonious model 9 to 0.133 under model 5. 4 In all cases, the lower endpoint of the 95% confidence interval does not fall below 0.056 and is typically closer to 0.09. Taken as a whole these results would seem to suggest an effect of EDR on voting among non-EDR-state African-American residents that is around a 10 percentage point increase.
Matching
Matching provides an alternative means to estimate the effect of EDR on voting among non-EDR-state residents. We proceed by fitting a propensity score model 5 and then using the GenMatch function in the Matching package to create a matched dataset. One-to-one matches were constructed to achieve balance on the estimated propensity scores as well as the observed covariates (family income, education, sex, and age).
Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of the pre and post-matching conditional distributions of these variables given EDR status. Inspection of these figures suggests that balance on these variables was reasonable before matching and was improved by the matching procedure. The variable for which post-matching balance appears the worst is family income.
If we are satisfied with the degree of balance obtained by this procedure we can use the matched dataset to estimate ATC. Table 6 presents this estimate and associated measures of sampling variability. Here we see that the matching procedure produces an estimate of ATC that is equal to 0.144 (a 14 percentage point increase in turnout due to EDR among African-Americans) with a 95% confidence interval from almost 0.09 to nearly 0.20. As the results from these "traditional" analyses appear to be quite robust, we might infer that there is a large (10 percentage points or more) effect of EDR on turnout among African-American citizens living in non-EDR states. Of course, there are a number of reasons that we might question these seemingly robust results (e.g. there are far too few treated units to use as matches for control units, and there are undoubtedly unmeasured confounding variables that might affect the analysis). However, criticisms of this type may sometimes be ignored by analysts for at least two reasons. First, concerns of this type can be raised (and to some extent are raised) against every regression or matching analysis. Second, citing these concerns only establishes the possibility that these results are misleading. For example, a critic citing an unmeasured confounding variable must make the case that this variable has such a strong effect on the outcome variable, that its inclusion would eliminate this seemingly large and robust EDR effect.
In the remainder of this paper, we develop a Bayesian potential-outcomes process analysis to provide posterior estimates for the effect on African-American turnout of the adoption of EDR in non-EDR states. This analysis shows that data exist within the 2004 CPS to demonstrate that turnout effect cannot feasibly be as large as the results in this section imply.
Path Analysis with Potential Outcomes
In order to demonstrate the use of post-treatment variables and process information, we will define a path analytic approach within the framework of potential outcomes. Suppose we have three causally ordered dichotomous variables: a treatment condition variable, a mediating variable, and an outcome variable, where the two values of the mediating variable are takes (1) and doesn't take (0). For example, if the treatment condition variable and the outcome variable are taken from the election day registration example in Section 3, then we can define the mediating variable to be whether or not an individual is registered at some point on election day. Figure 2 represents the causal ordering between these variables, and the arrow labels (a i , b i , and c i ) represent causal effects. Note that the effects are indexed by i so that we allow for causal heterogeneity across units (this model is consistent with a non-randomized encouragement design with possible direct effects). In the remainder of this section we will explicitly define these effects and demonstrate that when the treatment condition, the mediator and the outcome are dichotomous, and a i , b i , and c i are defined appropriately, the standard path analysis formula holds at the unit level. In other words, the individual treatment effect (ITE) equals a i · b i + c i .
The Effect of the Treatment on the Mediator
The first causal effect on the indirect path is the effect of the treatment on the mediator (a i ). This effect can be described in exactly the same terms as the effect of the treatment on the outcome as presented in Section 2. However, because of the correspondence with an encouragement design, we adopt the terminology from Angrist et al. (1996) (which utilizes a special case of the model in this paper). Table 7 presents the mediator response types and the individual treatment effects on the mediator.
As in Section 2, we cannot directly observe the mediator response types, but we can rule out some of them. Continuing our running focus on the control units (treatment units can be dealt with analogously), we find that the observed mediator values for the control units present the possible compliance types as represented in Table 8 . However, if our goal is to make statements about the causal questions presented in Section 2, we need only make inference about the proportion of compliers in the first two rows and about the proportion of defiers in the last two rows. Note that in order to be fully general, we condition the analysis on all observed variables. 
The Effect of the Mediator on the Outcome and the Indirect Effect
The second effect on the indirect path is the effect of the mediator on the outcome variable (b i ). In fact, we can define two such effects for each unit: one with the treatment variable held in the control condition and one with the treatment variable held in the treatment condition. However, since we are focusing on the control units in this paper, we will define b i to be the mediator effect with the treatment variable held in the control condition. Table 9 presents these response types and effects. Glynn (2009) showed that a unit specific indirect effect for the control units can be written as the product of the a i and b i effects when the treatment and mediator are dichotomous. Appendix A generalizes this proof to the case of heterogeneous unit-level linear potential-outcomes models with product interactions. Given this unit level product rule, Table 10 presents the possible types and effects for the indirect path for the control units after assuming an effect for the treatment on the mediator. Note that this definition corresponds with our intuitive understanding of causal pathways. For example, an individual is helped to vote through the indirect path if the individual is a complier in that election day registration would cause them to be registered and that individual is allowed to vote by being registered. Note also that "allowed" has a very specific meaning here. For the registration example, there will be no prevented or always individuals (i.e. you can't vote without begin registered). However, there will be both allowed and never succeed individuals in the population.
Because we specified a joint distribution over the observed variables and compliance types in Section 4.1, in order to fully specify the joint distribution over compliance types and the response-tomediator types we must specify the distribution over the response-to-mediator types conditionally on the compliance types. Therefore, we must now specify the distribution of the fraction allowed for rows 1-2 and 7-8 and the distribution of the fraction prevented over rows 3 -6 of Table 10.
The Direct Effect
The final effect of the path analysis is the direct effect of the treatment on the outcome (c i ). In fact, there are many definitions of direct effects (Pearl, 2001; Frangakis and Rubin, 2002; Robins, 2003) , and in order to reconstruct the response types and the effects from Section 2, we must choose the direct effect carefully. Because we have chosen to define the effect of the mediator on the outcome (b i ) while holding the treatment in the control condition, we must now define the direct effect to be the effect of the treatment on the outcome while holding the mediator at the level it would have obtained if the treatment condition had been observed (this can be seen in the decomposition of Appendix A). Therefore, when the treatment has no effect on the mediator, we should consider the controlled direct effect of the treatment on the outcome with the mediator held at the observed value, and when the treatment has an effect on the mediator, we should consider the controlled direct effect of the treatment on the outcome with the mediator held at the non-observed value. 6 Table 11 presents the corresponding direct effect types and c effects when the analysis is focused on the control units.
Pearl (2001) and Robins (2003) showed that the effects and types described in Section 2 can be written by adding the direct and indirect effects described in this paper. Given the unit level product rule for the indirect effect and this unit level rule for adding direct and indirect effects, Table 12 presents the possible types and effects for the direct path for the control units after assuming an effect for the treatment on the mediator and an effect for the mediator on the outcome (Appendix B presents this table in standard potential outcome notation). Note that this definition corresponds with our typical understanding of causal pathways. For example, if an individual had been registered prior to the election in question, then election day registration would have no effect on their registration status and hence there could be no indirect effect. However, such an individual could be helped to vote through the direct path if the adoption of election day registration had led to increased media attention that reminded the individual to vote. Note as well that because we have previously specified a joint distribution over the compliance types and the response-to-mediator types, in order to fully specify the joint distribution over all types, we must specify the distribution of direct effect types conditionally on compliance types and response-to-mediator types. Therefore, we must now specify the fraction directly helped for rows 1-3, 7, 9, 11-13, and the fraction directly hurt for rows 4-6, 8, 10, 14-16 of Table 12 .
Using Process Analysis to Assess the Turnout Effects of Election Day Registration on African Americans
The traditional analysis from Section 3 would lead the researcher to conclude that EDR would have had a positive turnout effect for African-Americans in non-EDR states of at least 10%. Furthermore, conditioning the analysis on the traditional omitted variables does not diminish the estimated size of the effect.
The analysis using process information paints a very different picture. Table 4 presents the data  from Table 3 with a variable included for whether an individual was registered to vote. We note that this table contains two structural zeros (you can't vote without registering) and that the data are quite informative for the remaining 6 cells so there is no harm in using a Dirichlet(0.001, . . . , 0.001) prior for the non-zero cell proportions. Because we focus on the turnout effects for the control (EDR = 0) individuals, we must specify probabilities for the 4 + 8 + 16 = 28 causal parameters corresponding to the rows of Tables 8, 10 , and 12 of Section 4. Luckily, the structure of the current application has a number of features that greatly reduce the number specification decisions that must be made.
Due to the fact that individuals cannot vote unless they are registered, "prevented" mediator effects individuals (Table 10 rows 3-6), and "always" mediator effects individuals (Table 10 rows 7-8) are not possible. Furthermore, this means that Table 12 rows 5-8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 are not possible, and that the direct effect must be zero for any "never takers" or "defiers" among the non-EDR individuals. Therefore, we are left with only 12 possible types of individuals, and these are presented in Table 13 (this table is also presented with potential outcomes notation in Table  16 ).
Furthermore, given this reduction of types, plausible assumptions can now provide information about the overall response type and the ITE for some of these individuals. For example, suppose we are willing to assume that EDR has no direct effects. This implies that Table 13 rows 4, 5, 9, and 11 are not possible. Furthermore, note that the removal of row 9 implies that the 676 non-EDR individuals who registered and didn't vote must be never voters with an ITE of zero. This assumption can be relaxed if need be, but small amounts of direct effects do not have a substantial impact on the causal parameters of interest. 7 If we also assume that EDR cannot prevent people from voting (i.e. no defiers), then Table 13 rows 7 and 10 are not possible, and the removal of row 10 in combination with the previous removal of row 11 implies that the 5,170 non-EDR individuals who registered and voted are "always voters" with an ITE of zero. Again, this assumption can be relaxed by allowing small numbers of defiers, however, this will not have a substantial impact on the casual parameters. Furthermore, due to the lack of negative mediator effects in this application and the lack of direct effects, defiers can only have "never" or "hurt" response types. Therefore, this assumption has the effect of increasing ATC. 8 The no direct effect and no defier assumptions limit our specification problem to the 1,276 non-EDR individuals who didn't register or vote. If we further assume that any complier will vote (i.e. if you register on election day, you are sure to vote), then Table 13 row 3 is removed from the analysis, and the specification problem for the 1,276 individuals reduces to a choice between rows 1, 2 and row 6. 9 Therefore, the only question remaining is the proportion of compliers among the 1,276 non-EDR individuals who didn't register or vote.
In order to examine the sensitivity of causal parameters (such as ATC) to this proportion of compliers among the non-EDR individuals who didn't register or vote, we model the probability of being a complier among this group with a Beta distribution. For example, Figure 3 (a) shows a Beta(1, 1) (i.e. uniform) prior distribution for the probability of compliance in this group, and
Figure 3 (b) shows the corresponding posterior distribution for ATC. Notice that this analysis indicates an ATC that is likely to be smaller than the estimate from the previous section, and there is a reasonable probability that ATC is close to zero (the posterior median is 0.09). However, the uniform prior does not correspond to reasonable beliefs because extreme and non-extreme compliance probabilities are equally likely under this prior. Therefore, we should examine the posterior distribution for ATC across a number of more plausible prior distributions for the probability of compliance.
Fortunately, the 2004 CPS contains additional information that a proper Bayesian should utilize in the specification of prior distributions-unregistered respondents were asked why they did not register (the responses from the 1,276 individuals under consideration are presented in Table 14 ). Note that while these responses are not dispositive as to the proportion of compliers among this group, they do provide a means for specifying reasonable prior distributions. For example, if we believe that the 209 + 66 = 275 individuals represented the first two rows of Table 14 are compliers based on their responses, and we believe that the 40 + 94 + 3 + 445 + 46 + 94 = 772 individuals represented in rows 3-8 are never takers based on their responses, and we further believe that we have not obtained any information about the compliance type from the individuals represented in the last four rows based on their responses, then we should specify the prior distribution for the probability of compliance as a Beta(275, 772) distribution. This distribution is presented in Figure  3 (c), and the corresponding posterior distribution is presented in Figure 3 (d). Note that this posterior distribution seems to directly contradict the results from the traditional analysis. Nearly 100% of the distribution is less than 0.06, and therefore the ATC values considered in Section 3 would be deemed effectively impossible.
We can also use this approach to consider what must be believed in order to obtain posterior support consistent with the results from Section 3. For example, if we believe that all of the respondents in rows 9-12 of Table 14 are also compliers, then the distribution for the probability of compliance should be a Beta(504, 772) distribution. This prior and the corresponding ATC posterior are presented in Figure 3 (e) and (f). Note that nearly 100% of the posterior distribution in Figure 3 (f) is less than 0.09. Therefore, if you believe that direct effects are minimal, and you want to have posterior support consistent with the estimates from Section 3, you must believe that some of the 772 respondents from rows 3-8 of Table 14 are possibly not never takers. Since these respondents indicate reasons for not registering that would seem to be unaffected by a relaxation of the registration deadlines, this sort of assertion will be hard to maintain.
Conclusion
It is now widely accepted that the consideration of pre-treatment variables in combination with assumptions (e.g. ignorability) can improve our knowledge about causal effects. In this paper, we have developed a Bayesian potential-outcomes causal model to demonstrate that the consideration of post-treatment variables in combination with assumptions (i.e. process information) can also improve our knowledge about causal effects. Furthermore, we have shown that survey questions about potential outcomes can be used to inform a Bayesian sensitivity analysis within this framework.
The application within this paper demonstrates conclusively that there are cases in which a traditional (although simple) regression/matching analysis will produce the wrong answer, while a simple Bayesian process analysis will produce at least a plausible range of posterior distributions. Of course, there will be many cases where such a Bayesian sensitivity analysis will be uninformative for the parameter of interest, and in such cases, the analyst will benefit from an approach that combines the information available in both pre-treatment and post-treatment variables. Future Figure 3: Prior distributions of compliance probability and associated posterior ATC distributions Panel (a) shows a uniform prior distribution for the probability of compliance and panel (b) shows the associated posterior ATC distribution. Panel (c) shows a Beta(275, 772) prior distribution for the probability of compliance which corresponds to the belief that Table 14 provides evidence of 275 compliers and 772 never takers. Panel (d) shows the associated posterior ATC distribution. Panel (e) shows a Beta(504, 772) prior distribution for the probability of compliance which corresponds to the belief that Table 14 provides evidence of 504 compliers and 772 never takers. Panel (d) shows the associated posterior ATC distribution.
work will address this point. Finally, we note that because the traditional ignorability assumption in the dichotomous frame-work identifies only the proportion helped minus the proportion hurt among various subpopulations, there are causal parameters other than ATC and ATT that are not identified by traditional ignorability assumptions (e.g. the proportion hurt among the treated units). Furthermore, the number of such causal parameters increases when the treatment and/or outcome are not dichotomous. In such cases, it would be advisable to utilize information from as many sources as possible. Post-treatment variables and process information represent one possible source. However, even for the simple case presented in this paper (with dichotomous treatment, mediator, and outcome), the task of specifying assumptions can be quite onerous. The application in this paper greatly simplified the process, but in general, for analysis on the control units, one must specify probabilities (or hierarchical distributions) for each row of Tables 8 ,10 , and 12. If inference is also desired for the treated units, or if a more complex path structure is utilized, the specification problem grows quickly. Therefore, the general use of rigorous process analysis requires a great deal of care in specifying assumptions, and the use of stronger modeling assumptions will likely be necessary in practice.
Appendix A: Path Analysis with Potential Outcomes
Suppose the following linear potential-outcomes model holds for three causally ordered variables, X i , M i , and Y i , where i = 1, ..., n indexes the units of analysis in the study.
In this model, M i (x) represents the potential values of the mediating variable, and Y i (x, m) represents the joint potential outcome for unit i. Note that α 0i and β 0i can be decomposed into an intercept and an error term if desired. Note as well that the linearity assumption implicit in these two equations is satisfied trivially when X and M are binary because the α i and β i parameters are unit specific.
Given these potential variables, we can define the traditional potential outcomes recursively.
and the total effect of a unit treatment change can be written as the following:
Furthermore, this total effect can be decomposed into an indirect effect (holding the direct measure of treatment at its initial value),
and a type of direct effect (holding the mediating variable at the value determined by the new treatment value),
Notice that this decomposition corresponds to some extent with the traditional notions of path analysis. The indirect effect is the unit specific effect X on M multiplied by the unit specific effect of M on Y at the initial value of X. The direct effect is the unit specific effect of X on Y with M held at the value it would obtain under the new value of X.
Appendix B
If we write the potential outcomes in the notation specified in Appendix A with binary X, M and Y , then the unobserved potential outcome for the control units can be written as
where M (1) is the unobserved value of the mediating variable that would have been observed if the unit had received treatment, Y (1, 1) is the joint potential outcome that the unit would have had if the treatment and the mediating variable had both been one, and Y (1, 0) is the joint potential outcome that the unit would have had if the treatment had been one and the mediating variable had been zero. Table 15 demonstrates which of these joint potential outcomes are pertinent to the total effect conditional on the assumed value of M (1), and presents the pairs of these joint potential outcomes that comprise the effect of the mediator on the outcome and the direct effect. (1) take (1) always taker 1-1=0 reject (0) reject (0) never taker 0-0=0 take (1) reject (0) complier 1-0=1 reject (0) take (1) defier 0-1=-1 (0) fail (0) never succeed 0-0=0 succeed (1) fail (0) allowed 1-0=1 fail (0) succeed (1) prevented 0-1=-1 (1) succeed (1) direct always 1-1=0 fail (0) fail (0) direct never 0-0=0 succeed (1) fail (0) direct helped 1-0=1 fail (0) succeed (1) direct hurt 0-1=-1 Table 12 : Possible direct effect types, c effects, overall response types, and individual treatment effects conditional on the observed data, the assumed compliance type, and the assumed response-to-mediator type. (0) fail (0) comply (1) never (0) directly never or helped ({0, 1}) never or helped (1 × 0 + {0, 1} = {0, 1}) control reject (0) fail (0) comply (1) allowed ( (0) succeed (1) comply (1) prevented (-1) directly never or helped ({0, 1}) hurt or always (1 × −1 + {0, 1} = {−1, 0}) control reject (0) succeed (1) comply (1) always ( 
